# RAMAKRISHNA MISSION VIDYAMANDIRA

(Residential Autonomous College under University of Calcutta)

**B.A./B.Sc. FOURTH SEMESTER EXAMINATION, MAY 2014** 

SECOND YEAR

Date : 23/05/2014 Time : 11 am – 3 pm

#### **ECONOMICS (Honours)** Paper : IV

Full Marks: 100

# [Use a Separate Answer Book for each group]

## Group – A

## 1. Answer any three questions :

- a) A monopolist faces a demand curve  $y_i = Ap^{-r_i}$  in i-th market (i = 1,2). He faces a constant marginal cost C. Does this monpolist have an incentive to price discriminate? Explain with reasons. [4]
- b) Explain the marginal cost price regulation for a natural monopoly, with proper diagrams and inttuition. [4]
- c) 'Movie tickets are more expensive in the evenings'. Explain with reference to the proper type of price discrimination. [4]
- d) Define isoprofit curve and reaction curve in the Cournot model.
- e) In a duopoly market firms produce close substitutes under the following demand and cost conditions

$$D_{1}(p_{1},p_{2}) = 10 - p_{1} + 0.5 \frac{p_{2}}{p_{1}} ; C_{1} = 0$$
$$D_{2}(p_{1},p_{2}) = 20 - 2p_{2} + \frac{p_{1}}{p_{2}} ; C_{2} = 0$$

Construct the price game and find out the equilibrium.

- f) Establish the relationship between monopoly power and price elasticity of demand. [4]
- 2. Answer **any one** question :
  - State TRUE, FALSE or UNCERTAIN with proper explanation : a) i)

A firm is a monopolist in the market for good X. The government has perfect information about the marginal and average cost curves of this firm and also has perfect information about the demand curve for good X. It is claimed that the economy will reach an efficient outcome if the government sets a price ceiling that makes price equal to the marginal cost, evaluated at the quantity where the marginal cost intersects the demand curve. [4]

- ii) What is a 'two-part' tariff? Suppose a monopolist faces demand curve Q = 100 P, and cost function  $c(q) = q^2$ . Design a two-part tariff that maximises the monpolist's profits. What is the dead-weight loss generated by the monopoly? [4]
- b) Suppose there are only two firms producing boneless hilsa. Each is considering whether to advertise or not. The profit estimates are summarized in the following payoff matrix :

	Firm B advertises	Firm B doesn't advertise
Firm A advertises	Profit $A = 10$	Profit $A = 15$
	Profit $B = 10$	Profit $B = 5$
Firm A doesn't advertise	Profit $A = 5$	Profit $A = 12$
	Profit $B = 15$	Profit $B = 12$

i) What is Firm A's best strategy for each of Firm B's possible actions?

- ii) What is Firm B's best strategy for each of Firm A's possible actions?
- iii) If each firm chooses its best strategy, what will be the outcome?
- iv) Is it a Pareto optimal outcome?

[2]

[2]

[3×4]

[2+2]

[1×8]

[2+2]

[5]

[5]

[5]

[3]

#### 3. Answer any two questions :

a) Suppose you are given the following information :

Each month an airlines sells 1500 business class tickets at Rs. 200 per ticket, and 6,000 economy class tickets at Rs. 80 per ticket. The airlines treats business class tickets and economy class as two separate markets. The airlines knows the demand curves for the two markets and maximises profits. It is also known that demand curve of the each of the two markets is linear and marginal cost associated with each-ticket is Rs. 50.

- i) Use the above informations to construct the demand curves for economy class and business class tickets.
- ii) What would be the equilibrium quantities and prices if the airlines could not get involved in price discrimination?
- iii) Suppose that a monopolist can produce in discrete non-negative integer units. Its cost function C(q) is as follows :

 $C(q) = 1+q^2 \text{ if } q \ge 0$  $= 0 \quad \text{if } q = 0$ 

The monopolist faces a demand function  $D(P) = \frac{9}{P}$ . How much should the monopolist optimally

produce & sell?

- b) i) Explain the following concepts : percieved demand curve, proportional demand curve and market demand curve in a monopolistically competitive market. [4]
  - ii) Suppose all consumers in an economy behave as if there is one consumer with utility function :  $u_1(x_1) + u_2(x_2) + y$ , where  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  are the amounts of good 1 & 2, respectively and 'y' is the money spent on all other goods. Suppose good 1 is supplied by a firm that acts competitively and good 2 is supplied by a firm that acts like a monopoly. The cost function for good 'i' is denoted by  $c_i(x_i)$  and there is a specific tax of  $t_i$  on the output of industry 'i'. Assume  $c_i'' > 0$ ,  $p_i'' < 0$ ,  $p_i' < 0$ .

A) Derive an expression for 
$$\frac{dx_i}{dt_i}$$
 for i = 1,2. Explain the relevant signs of the expression. [5]

- B) Given a change in outputs  $(dx_1, dx_2)$ , derive an expression for the change in welfare.
- C) Suppose that we consider taxing one of the two industries and using the proceeds to subsidize others. Should we tax the competitive industry or monopoly? [3]
- c) i) "In a modern business environment a firm is characterised by the divorce of ownership and management, and therefore managers try to maximise their own utility"—discuss. [3]
  - ii) Assuming that maximisation of sales revenue subject to a profit constraint maximises manager's utility function, use an appropriate model to show how the equilibrium of a firm is determined. [12]
- d) i) Consider two firms with same cost structures, operating in an oligopolistic environment taking output decisions and moving simultaneously. Using linear demand and cost curves compute the equilibrium price and quantities.
  - ii) If now they move sequentially with seller 1 moving first and seller 2 moving second, how will the equilibrium values of price and quantity change? Explain you answer in economic terms. [9]

## <u>Group – B</u>

### 4. Answer **any four** questions :

a) i) Suppose that  $y_i = \mu + e_i$ , where i = 1, 2, ..., n &  $e_i$ 's are independent errors with mean zero & variance  $\sigma^2$ . Show that  $\overline{y}$  is the least square estimate of  $\mu$ . [3]

[4×5]

- ii) Suppose that the son of a man of height x (in inches) attains a height that is normally distributed with mean x+1 and variance 4. What is the best prediction of the height at full growth of the son of a man who is 6 feet tall?
- b) Suppose that grades on a midterm and final have a correlation coefficient of 0.5 and both exams have an average score of 75 and a standard deviation of 10.
  - i) If a student's score on the midterm is 95, what would you predict his score on the final to be? [3]
  - ii) If a student scored 85 on the final, what would you guess about his score on the midterm? [2]
- c) In the context of the inference on the slope coefficient for the simple linear regression, derive the

relation  $r^2 = \frac{t^2}{t^2 + n - 2}$ , where r is the correlation coefficient and n being the number of observations.

[5]

[3]

[5]

[5]

[7]

[2×15]

- d) Given the data on y and x, explain what functional form you will use and how you will estimate the parameters if—
- i) y is a proportion and lies between 0 and 1.
  - ii) x > 0 and x assumes very large values relative to y. [2]
- e) For detecting heteroscedasticity, discuss the Gold-feld Quandt test.
- f) Consider the following regression-through origin model :

 $Y_i = \beta x_i + u_i \text{ for } i = 1,2$ 

You're told that  $u_1 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$  and  $u_2 \sim N(0, 2\sigma^2)$  and they are statistically independent. If  $x_1 = +1$  &  $x_2 = -1$ , obtain the weighted least squares (WLS) estimate of  $\beta$  and its variance. Is this variance better than the variance of the OLS estimator had you incorrectly assumed that both  $u_1 \& u_2 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ ? [3+2]

g) In studying the movement in the production workers' share in the value added (i.e labour's share), the following models were considered, based on annual data for 1949 – 1964.

**Model A :** 
$$Y_t = 0.4529 - 0.0041t; R^2 = 0.5284, d = 0.8252$$

**Model B :** 
$$Y_t = 0.4786 - 0.0127t + 0.0005t^2$$
;  $R^2 = 0.6629$ ,  $d = 1.82$ 

where  $Y_t$  = Labour's share and t = time

Find out whether there is serial correlation in both model A & B.

5. Answer **any two** questions :

# a) Consider the following regression model : $\frac{1}{Y_i} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \left(\frac{1}{X_i}\right) + u_i$ Here neither Y nor X assumes

zero value.

i) Is this a linear regression model?[2]ii) How would you estimate this model?[7]iii)What is the behaviour of Y as X tends to infinity?[3]iv)Can you give an example where such a model may be appropriate?[3]

b) A production function is specified as :  $y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + u_i$ , where  $u_i$  are iid N(0, $\sigma^2$ ) where y = output,  $x_1$  = Labour input and  $x_2$  = Capital input; i = 1,2,...23

The independent variables are non-stochastic. The following data are obtained on the above model :

$$\overline{x}_1 = 10, \quad \overline{x}_2 = 5, \quad \overline{y} = 12, \quad \sum_i x_{1i}^2 = 2312, \quad \sum_i x_{2i}^2 = 587, \quad \sum_i y_i^2 = 3322, \quad \sum_i x_{1i} x_{2i} = 1158,$$
  
 $\sum x_{1i} y_i = 2770 \ \& \ \sum x_{2i} y_i = 1388$ 

i) Compute  $\hat{\alpha}$ ,  $\hat{\beta}_1$  &  $\hat{\beta}_2$  and their standard errors. Present the regression equation.

ii) Find the 95% confidence intervals for  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta_1$  &  $\beta_2$  and test the hypothesis  $\beta_1 = 1$ .

iii)Find 95% confidence interval for  $\sigma^2$ .

c) The following are data on-

y = quit rate per 100 employees in manufacturing, x = unemployment rate The data for the US cover the period 1960-72

Year	У	X	Year	У	X
1960	1.3	6.2	1967	2.3	3.6
1961	1.2	7.8	1968	2.5	3.3
1962	1.4	5.8	1969	2.7	3.3
1963	1.4	5.7	1970	2.1	5.6
1964	1.5	5.0	1971	1.8	6.8
1965	1.9	4.0	1972	2.2	5.6
1966	2.6	3.2			

i) Calculate a regression of y on x  $y = \alpha + \beta x + u$ .

ii) Test the hypothesis  $H_0: \beta = 0$  against the alternative  $H_1: \beta \neq 0$  at the 5% significance level.

- iii)What is likely to be wrong with the assumptions of the classical normal linear model in this case? Discuss. [3]
- d) i) You are given the following age and price data for 10 randomly selected Toyota Tazzes between 1 & 6 years old. Here, age is in years and price is in thousands of Rands.

Age	6	6	6	2	2	5	4	5	1	4
Price	205	195	210	340	299	230	270	243	340	240

Obtain the intercept and slope estimate in the equation

Price =  $\hat{\beta}_0 + \hat{\beta}_1$  age

Comment on the direction of the relationship.

How much lower is price predicted to be if age is increased by two years. [4]

Verify that the residuals approximately sum to zero.

How much of the Variation in price for these 10 cars is explained by age? Explain [3]

ii) Consider the savings function

Sav =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ inc + u; u =  $\sqrt{\text{inc.e}}$  where e is a random variable with E(e) = 0 and Var(e) =  $\sigma_e^2$ . Here, 'Sav' denotes saving and 'inc' denotes income.

Assuming that e is independent of inc.

- Show that E(u/inc) = 0.
- Show that  $V(u/inc) = \sigma_e^2 inc$ . This means variance of 'sav' increases with 'inc'. [2]
- Provide a discussion that supports the assumption that the variance of savings increases with family income. [2]

[5] [3]

[7] [5]

[3]

[1]

standard normal variable. \*Abridged from Table 8 of Biometrika Tables for Statisticians, vol. I, with the kind permission of the Biometrika Trustees. For larger values of v, the variable  $\sqrt{2\chi^2} - \sqrt{2\nu - 1}$  may be used as a 48-290 49-645 50-993 52-336 53-672 66-766 79-490 91-952 104-215 116-321 140-169 26-757 28-300 29-819 31-319 32-801 34-267 35-718 37-156 38-582 39-997 41-401 42:796 44-181 45:558 46-928 18-548 20-278 21-955 23-589 25-188 0.005 7-879 10-597 12-838 14-860 16-750 76-154 88-379 100-425 112-329 41-638 42-980 44-314 124-116 45.642 46.963 48.278 49.588 50.892 38-932 40-289 24-725 26-217 27-688 29-141 30-578 32-000 33-409 34-805 36-191 37-566 63-691 6-635 9-210 11-345 13-277 13-277 16-812 18-475 20-090 21-666 23-209 0.01 59-342 71-420 83-298 95-023 106-629 118-136 129-561 5-024 7-378 9-348 111-143 12-832 34.170 35.479 40.646 41-923 43-194 44-461 45-722 46-979 0.025 23-337 24-736 26-119 27-488 28.845 30-191 31-526 32-852 38-076 39-364 14.449 16-013 17-535 19-023 20-483 21-920 36-781 TABLE III 22-DISTRIBUTION\* 67-505 90-531 113-145 55-759 37-652 40-113 41-337 42-557 43-773 14-067 15-507 16-919 18-307 19-675 21-026 22-362 23-685 24-996 26-296 27-587 28-869 30-144 31-410 35-172 36-415 38-885 7-815 9-488 11-070 12-592 32-671 33-924 3-841 0.05 Values of  $\chi^2_{\alpha,\nu}$ 18-493 34-764 43-188 51-739 69-126 77-929 26.509 7-962 8-672 9-390 12-338 13-848 15-379 16-928 60-391 14-611 1-145 1-635 2-167 2-733 3-325 3-940 4.575 5-226 5-892 6-571 7-261 0-117 10-851 16-151 11-591 13-091 0-004 0-103 0-352 0-711 0.95 48.758 57-153 65-647 74-222 11-688 13-120 13-844 5-308 16-047 24.433 32-357 40-482 10-283 0-975 3.816 5-009 5-629 6-262 6-908 7-564 8-231 8-231 8-907 9-591 16.791 0-216 0-484 0-831 1-237 2.180 3-247 14-573 1-690 0-001 53-540 9-542 10-196 10-856 11-524 12.198 2.879 13-565 14-256 14-953 22-164 707-92 37-485 61-754 70-065 8-260 45-442 **768-8** 1-646 2-088 2-558 4-660 5-229 5.812 6-408 7-015 7-633 0-554 0-872 1-239 3-571 0.000 0.020 0.115 0.297 4.107 66-0 20-706 35-535 43-275 51-172 59-196 67-328 11-160 13-787 6-265 6-844 7-434 8-034 8-643 9-260 9-886 10-520 11-808 13-121 5.142 5.697 12.461 0-995 0-000 0-010 0-072 0-207 0-412 0-676 2.156 2.603 3.074 3.565 4.075 4.601 1-344 0 m 4 v 3038578 00810 113 13 13 20 18 17 6 222222 8

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